Each year, the Leitner Center for International Law and Justice sponsors Fordham Law students to work in human rights endeavors around the world. All of the students interning this year have been invited to share their experiences here.
Monday, August 29, 2011
Iraqi Refugees in Egypt
Later, responding to a different question, he added, “Abu Layla should know where it is.”
And even later, “When you’re finished, put it in Abu Layla’s box."
All of which would have been helpful information, but I didn’t know who Abu Layla was. (By the way, names have been changed because, who knows?) I was too embarassed to ask, since everyone else seemed to know. However, by the end of the day I needed to know and approached our Iraqi office manager, Malik. "Malik, Amir keeps talking about Abu Layla. Who is that?"
The office manager is a stout, balding man who always dresses in trousers and an ironed polo shirt and sports a pair of large, gold-framed engineer-style glasses that I secretly covet. They have thick lenses and are super-retro-cool. They look like those worn by Walt in “Breaking Bad.” I thought about all of this as he grinned mischievously. “Jonathan,” he put a hand on my shoulder and laughed good-naturedly, “Abu Layla is me."
And so I had another embarassing lesson in Arabic culture. “Abu Shada” means father of Shada, and Iraqi adults are often called with reference to their first-born children.
Malik is a helpful and attentive office manager, and genial (he didn’t laugh at me too much). He is also a refugee from Iraq (most of the staff at the office are refugees). He speaks very good English, which has been common with my Iraqi clients, though with none of my African clients. And, of course, Iraqis speak Arabic, while Somalis, Ethiopians, and Eritreans do not (Sudanese do, for the most part).
Some of these Iraqi refugees government jobs and perhaps even joined the Ba’ath Party (which was often necessary to get a promotion if you worked for the government), which made them targets after Saddam Hussein’s government collapsed under the weight of U.S. bombs. Others aided or worked for American or Multi-National Forces, or translated for a U.S. media company, and were endangered because of their association with Westerners. Most are well-educated, middle-class folks, or at least they were back home. Which is to say that, for the most part, they have an easier time than other refugees in Egypt, but their lives here might be a far cry from what they had in Iraq. (This also means that Iraq is losing a lot of its educated professionals.
Well over two million Iraqis have fled their country since Hussein was deposed in 2003, and many others have been displaced internally. Of those who left, many have gone to Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. A smaller number went to Egypt, but this is a still a lot of people: there are estimates of 150,000 as of September 2008, and it’s surely increased since then. I’ve heard reports of people returning; after all, it’s not nearly as dangerous as it was a few years back. But violence continues in Iraq (28 people, including an MP, were killed at a mosque bombing on Saturday) and for many of these refugees, it is not safe to go back now.
Even for those with a middle-class background, being a foreigner is difficult in Egyt. For the most part, Iraqis are not legally permitted to work. Doctors, engineers, it makes no difference. They cannot enroll in public schools, so expensive private institutions are their only option. Many are drawing from dwindling savings accounts. Some have substantial government pensions, but Egypt does not allow these accounts to be transferred in-country, unlike the policies of Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. Many feel unwelcome in Egypt. And the revolution, by creating instability and by undermining the authority of the police, has unnerved many of the Iraqis I’ve spoken to. This may be why, according to the accounts I’ve heard, the number of Iraqis applying for resettlement is increasing.
Many apply to the quote-unquote normal refugee resettlement program of the UNHCR; others apply directly to a country’s immigration authority, for instance if they have a close relative who lives there and is willing to sponsor them. But those who fled Iraq because they worked with Americans are eligible to apply to the Direct Access Program (DAP). DAP is supposed to make it easier for these Iraqis to apply for resettlement to the US, for instance by not requiring a referral from the UNHCR or other agency. Iraqis who worked with Americans for more than one year (and were thusly endangered and had to flee, of course) can also apply for a Special Immigrant Visa (SIV).
These are very different than the UNHCR resettlement mechanism. Eligibility for the UNHCR program is based on vulnerability in the country of refuge, whereas DAP and SIV criteria don’t address that at all. They’re almost merit-based programs; the key to assembling an application is getting proof that the applicant did in fact work for the American military, or USAID, or whoever. Of course, they must have been targeted because of this association, as well, but that's not usually hard to prove. Stories of black Xs painted on doors and bullets in envelopes are all too common.
The process itself is fairly complex, which is one reason that many have not applied. Some (by now outdated, surely) stats I read reported that only 20,000 applications had been received, though 150,000 Iraqis are eligible for either DAP or SIV. Of those 20,000, only 4,500 or so had been resettled. There is a huge backlog of SIV applications waiting on approval from the US Chief of Mission; this step alone often takes more than a year. Both DAP and SIV require the applicant to provide documentation of their employment by USG or other eligible organizations, which they may not have. (In some cases, the USG insists on copies of contracts to which it is itself a party! The idea that it doesn’t have a copy already is unsettling.) These and other bureaucratic issues seem mundane enough, but since this is a program for people who may still be in mortal danger, such delays are very important. Consider that some people are applying while still in Iraq, where simply approaching the US Embassy in the Green Zone might not be safe. NYT ran an article about delays in the SIV program earlier this month, though I don’t think this issue gets a lot of media attention on the whole.
Saturday, August 27, 2011
Working Globally...Locally
I experienced an earthquake and now a hurricane, have teleconferenced with colleagues in Geneva, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaica, Bahamas, arranged a conference in Thailand, and gone into work early to make calls to Turkey. Where was I? In New York, of course! It's been quite an exciting summer working with the United Nations Development Programme ("UNDP") in the Gender Cluster of the HIV/AIDS Group of the Bureau for Development Policy ("BDP"). I had the privilege of touching livesglobally from the UN headquarters in New York this summer.
Friday, August 26, 2011
Summer Internship in Port-au-Prince, Haiti at the Bureau des Avocats Internationaux
Podcast on Illegal Eviction, http://ijdh.org/archives/20417
Final Whistle for 514 Families as Haitian Government Illegally Closes Stadium Camp, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/beatrice-lindstrom/final-whistle-for-514-fam_b_911638.html
Hundreds of Displaced Families Face Violence and Threats of Unlawful Eviction in the Carrefour Neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, http://ccrjustice.org/hundreds-of-displaced-families-face-violence-and-threats-of-unlawful-eviction-carrefour-neighborhood
Displaced Women Demand Justice in Port au Prince, http://www.commondreams.org/view/2011/06/30
Friday, August 19, 2011
ICTY and It's Power to Arrest
The dramatic arrests this summer of both General Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić have brought the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) back into the international spotlight. After 18 years the ICTY has now arrested all 161 of its indictees. The arrest power of the ICTY raises interesting jurisdictional and pragmatic questions. In order to understand what powers the ICTY actually has to arrest, and how this impacted its ability to effectuate its warrants, this blog details an overview of this fascinating legal area, focusing particularly on its initial arrests, and then the “high-level” arrests it has made in the last decade.
In 1993 the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 827 which formally established the ICTY “for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia.” While the ICTY does not have a formal arrest apparatus, Article 29 of the ICTY Statute provides that UN member states “comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an order issued by a Trial Chamber.” Consequently, the ICTY has been able to utilize a variety of methods to arrest indictees. In the early years the multinational force under the auspices of NATO had the power to arrest. On July 10, 1997 NATO made its first arrest attempt. Operation Tango, as it was codenamed, brought soldiers to Prijedor, a small town in the north west of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here they spent four weeks staking out Simo Drljača, a former Serbian police chief thought to have been instrumental in organizing ethnic cleansing in Muslim towns. The mission went awry when the arrest by Special Air Service operatives from the United Kingdom turned into a shootout with Drljača; who ultimately was shot dead. In another Operation Tango mission, executed simultaneously to the Drljača mission, NATO forces disguised as Red Cross officials successfully arrested the President of the Municipal Assembly of Prijedor, Milan Kovačević.
In the same year the ICTY examined the legality of its arrest power. In the Prosecutor v. Slavko Dokmanović the Accused challenged his arrest, claiming he was subject to irregular rendition. Dokmanović was arrested while a livery service that he thought was taking him to a meeting actually was undercover officers. The Trial Chamber ruled that Dokmanović had not been forcibly abducted, but rather just “lured” into the car, and that this was within ICTY powers.
In Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolić, the Accused was arrested via an abduction by unknown persons who subsequently turned him over to the ICTY. Nikolić argued that his abductors had violated the sovereignty of the former Yugoslavia and this was a grave breach of his own rights as a citizen of the country. The ICTY Appeals Chambers held, however, that arresting and trying an international criminal took precedent over the competing interest of state sovereignty.
The first high-level arrest was realized in autumn of 2000. The fall of former Yugoslavian President Slobodan Milošević transformed the political landscape dramatically and changed the dynamic of the ICTY’s arrest apparatus. Tragically, Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić’s dedication to international justice, rather than Serbian nationalists, would ultimately cost him his life. Until Đinđić’s assassination in 2003, his government, fueled by international pressure, became the main driver for ICTY arrests. President Milošević was arrested by the local police in a 36 hour standoff at his villa home in Belgrade and eventually turned over to the ICTY to face international criminal charges.
Eight years later, on July 21, 2008, Radovan Karadžić, the former President of Republika Srpska, was arrested. Donned with a shaggy beard and long grey hair, he had been living under the assumed identity as an alternative medicinal healer. Karadžić’s arrest was reputed to have resulted from a tip from locals in Belgrade who learned of his identity. While there may have been less political will in Serbia to arrest ICTY indictees after Đinđić’s assassination, the European Union leveraged Serbia’s membership to the sought-after club by making it contingent on Serbia effectuating the remaining arrests warrants.
After Karadžić’s arrest, this left two indictees at large, Ratko Mladić and Goran Hadžić. Over the last decade, Mladić, according to the New York Times "received vital…assistance from Serbian military forces and several of the country's past governments." He was apparently seen at football matches and weddings throughout these years. But, on May 26th, three special units after surveilling his residence in the village of Lazarevo for two weeks, surrounded it and made the historic arrest. He was immediately brought before a Serbian court, and in a matter of days extradited to The Hague to face his international indictment at the ICTY.
Approximately two months later, in bizarre twist of events, Hadžić’s arrest finalised the ICTY indictments. Apparently the Serbian authorities were tipped off to Hadžić’s whereabouts when he tried to sell an Amadeo Modigliani painting in order to continue financing his fugitive lifestyle. He had been living under a pseudonym in Russia, and was hidden by a sympathetic Serbian nationalist priest; however, a special under-cover police force surrounded him deep in a forest were he had arranged to meet a friend. He too was arrested and brought to The Hague to stand trial.
It appears that the success of the ICTY’s arrest power was predicated on a mixture of international co-operation, changing political tides in Serbian politics, international pressure, and a little luck. It will be interesting to see how other international criminal bodies reflect on the legacy left by the ICTY.
Sources
1. European Journal of International Law
http://ejil.oxfordjournals.org/content/9/1/174.short
2. BBC News “Milosevic Arrested”
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1254263.stm
3. The Atlanitc “Why Serbia Captured Mladic and Pakistan Harbored Bin Laden
4. Goran Hadzic Arrest: A Turning Point for Serbia
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-14238332
5. Charter of the United Nations
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml
6. The Hunt for the former Yugoslavia’s War Criminals: Mission Accomplished
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/03/former-yugoslavia-war-crimes-hunt
7. International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia - Enotes
http://www.enotes.com/genocide-encyclopedia/international-criminal-tribunal-former-yugoslavia
8. ICTY Statute
http://www.icls.de/dokumente/icty_statut.pdf
Yes, people actually flee TO Egypt
It’s relatively quiet behind the dusty iron gates of St. Andrews Refugee Services. There’s no sign, but the church steeple is visible from the street. There’s another church building across the way, however, and that’s where I was directed my first day, when all I could do to ask for directions was to make a cross with my fingers. I can still hear the din of traffic and the shouts from the informal microbus station across the street, the drivers yelling out their destinations to passersby. But a few trees - there are too few trees in downtown Cairo - shield the courtyard somewhat from the sun and the sound. In any event, as soon as I’m inside the small office, I plop myself directly under the air conditioner, the buzz of which drowns out everything else. I wasn’t in the office during the last protest outside the High Court building, which is just across the square, Midan el-Esaaf, but if I was, I might not have heard it.
I’ve arrived just as our office officially opens. Two Iraqi staff are checking over the day’s schedule and making some tea, spooning heaps of sugar into the small glasses of Lipton. I join them, enjoying the emptiness of the office. Soon the small space will be packed: interns hunched over laptops or interviewing clients, interpreters translating documents on the table in the tiny kitchen, and computer power cables everywhere. Several times a day we play a version of musical chairs, shuffling between tables when someone has an appointment with a client.
The office has been busier than usual, I've been told. Things shut down for a while during the revolution. Even when there weren’t clouds of tear gas floating by, the unstable situation counseled against asking clients to make the trek into Downtown. Intake request forms are still piled high, and despite the pace of work we haven’t seemed make much of a dent.
It’s not clear if the flow of new refugees entering Egypt slowed down due to the revolution (even someone fleeing violence in Sudan, for instance, might think twice about going to Cairo when there are tanks in the streets). It’s not clear how many refugees there are in Egypt, for that matter; the figure changes from one report to another. The UN says 50,000, others say 200,000. Sudanese comprise a large portion, as well as Somalis, Ethiopians, Eritreans, and Iraqis. My own clients are Somali and Iraqi, as it happens. But I’m getting ahead of myself.
I’m working at the Resettlement Legal Assistance Project (RLAP) at St. Andrew’s Refugee Services. St. Andrew’s has been around for a while and has several programs, including a school teaching a Sudanese curriculum, and a psychosocial services office. RLAP is a much younger entity. It began in 2008 as the Iraqi Information Office, and dealt specifically with the growing number of Iraqis who had fled the violence in their home country. Presently, the client base is broader and the mission is more focused. RLAP assists refugees in Egypt - from any country - to apply for resettlement to a third country (meaning, neither their country of origin nor Egypt).
“Refugee” is a term of art referring to someone who fled their country of domicile because of a well-founded fear of persecution based on their membership in at least one of five enumerated categories: race, religion, national origin, social group, and political opinion. Ideally, having fled they can enjoy a quote-unquote “durable solution,” but this is not always the case.
Cairo is a big, crowded city - the "greater metropolitan area" holds over 15 million - with high unemployment and poverty rates. I don’t want to imagine what would happen were the government to discontinue its long-standing subsidies on staple products - rice, cooking oil, petrol, and so forth. Being poor in Cairo, and most refugees in Cairo - excluding the Iraqis, who I’ll discuss more in another post - are poor, is tough. It’s even tougher if you’re seen and treated as an outsider, don’t have many legal rights, and don’t speak Arabic (while Sudanese speak Arabic, many Somalis, Ethiopians and Eritreans do not).
In general, refugees in Egypt cannot work legally (and given the unemployment figures, it would be hard to find a job anyway), so are dependent on disbursements from Caritas and other organizations to pay for rent and groceries. They can’t go to public school (Egypt is signatory to the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, but exempted itself from the requirement to provide elementary education same as nationals), and neither do most have the means to pay for private education. Couple this with the antipathy many refugees face on the streets of Cairo, and it’s no mystery why many hope to live in the U.S. or Canada or Sweden, or whichever country will have them.
Most are not resettled. Applications go to the UNHCR (UN High Commissioner for Refugees), which evaluates them and calls in some applicants for interviews, a number of which may eventually be referred for resettlement. The UN's criteria require that an applicant's situation be particularly bad (viz, not a "durable solution") in certain defined ways: a need for legal or physical protection, suffering from the lingering effects of violence or torture in your country of origin, a serious medical condition that cannot be treated in the present location, and so forth. The list seemed fairly comprehensive to my eyes when I first read it in preparation for this summer. I hadn't worked on refugee issues before, so I didn’t know what the list doesn’t cover, nor how large the gap is between the words in the UNHCR resettlement handbook and the reality. If you’re a Somali woman who is verbally, even physically harassed by men on the street every time you leave your apartment, you’re probably not eligible. If you come home late one night and are raped, you might have a chance, but the odds aren't good. If you decide to report that rape to the police and they refuse to help you, tell you it was your own fault, and throw you out of the station, you’ll have an even better shot. Before that, the resettlement door is closed to you.
The bar is set pretty high. Only 17 countries allow refugees to be resettled within their borders, though a large proportion - somewhere around 75%, though it varies year to year - go to a single nation: the United States. Resettling refugees who are often destitute (having fled their homes and possessions) and in need of significant assistance to acclimate to a different culture and language, is a financial burden as well as a political one, and there’s little pressure to accept more. The UNHCR estimates that this year it will only consider 3,600 refugees in Egypt for resettlement, and will probably only provide a resettlement referral for 900.
In this situation, a vital part of my job has been to quickly assess the strength of a potential client’s case and, sadly, to turn them away if they don’t have a shot. The office is small and more intake requests are added to the pile every day. Meanwhile, the violence that drove people from their homes in the first place continues. War did not end with the birth of South Sudan, and people are still hiding out in caves in the Nuba Mountains to avoid the northern government’s bombing sorties. Somalia’s officially recognized government controls only a few square blocks of Mogadishu, while militias hold sway in the rest of the country. The conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea remains unresolved. Iraq is shaken by more bombings all too often. For most refugees in Egypt, it will not be safe to return in the foreseeable future. Given the odds for resettlement, the vast majority must make Cairo their home for a long time to come.
Those whose story might fit into the categories recognized by the UN are taken on as clients. My job has been to interview those clients, teasing out their histories, and then write them up in a way that will persuade the UN of their eligibility. This is easier said than done, especially given the cultural and linguistic differences between myself and the clients. I must interview all of my African clients through an interpreter, and if the testimony differs from what the client says if they're called in for an interview, they could be deemed unbelievable by UN interviewers trained to sniff out fraudulent applicants. A lot of details are needed to write a compelling application, so experiences and events are rehashed several times, and sometimes new information is gleaned each time. Sometimes the story is revised in the retelling, which makes me nervous even if the new information strengthens the client's case.
Several more staff have arrived by now, and I’ve moved my computer once already to cede my prime real estate under the aircon to someone with a client. Soon one of my own clients will be here to review her testimony and verify the timeline of atrocities that makes her case viable, and I’ll need to shoo away my fellow interns, whose laptops now share the small table with mine. Back to work.
Tuesday, August 16, 2011
Rule of Law in Southern Africa
Earlier in the summer SALC co-hosted, along with Redress and African Rights, a conference focused on ensuring that Rwandan genocide suspects living in southern Africa are prosecuted for their crimes. The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was meant to ensure that those most responsible for the Rwandan genocide would be prosecuted, but was never meant to be the only forum for trying all suspected genocidaires. The ICTR has also stopped taking new cases, and will be winding down in 2013, but there are still many suspected perpetrators living in southern Africa. The conference then focused on ways that southern African states could ensure that genocide suspects do not continue to benefit from impunity. It examined the concept of aut judicaire aut dedaire (extradite or prosecute), which refers to a state’s obligation to either prosecute an individual or to extradite that person to a state willing to prosecute. For states unwilling to extradite suspects to Rwanda, the conference examined the ability of states to prosecute on the basis of universal jurisdiction. The conference was aimed at spurring action, because to date no southern African states have extradited any suspects to Rwanda nor have any southern African states prosecuted any suspects for their crimes. This is in contrast to European and North American countries, which have prosecuted genocide suspects after refusing to extradite them to Rwanda out of concern that fair trail standards would not be met. The conference brought together civil society organizations and government officials, both from the region and globally, and sought to determine how to overcome barriers to prosecution that spring from both a lack of political will and a lack of capacity.
SALC also co-hosted, along with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Lawyers Association and the International Commission of Jurists, a conference on the future of the SADC Tribunal. SADC is a regional economic body, and one of its organs is a Tribunal that can hear cases between states, and between individuals and states where the individual has exhausted all other remedies or is unable to proceed under the domestic jurisdiction. Crucially, the court is able to hear cases that concern individual human rights violations.
However, the SADC Summit has recently suspended the Tribunal, during which time a review process is meant to take place. The review and suspension of the Tribunal was precipitated by a decision of the Tribunal in which it ruled that the seizure of land from white Zimbabwean farmers was done illegally. Zimbabwe refused to enforce the decision and argued that the Tribunal had been improperly constituted. Rather than sanction Zimbabwe, SADC ordered a review of the Tribunal. SADC hired outside consultants to conduct the review, and the consultants concluded that the Tribunal was properly constituted and made a number of recommendations for the improvement of the Tribunal. The SADC Committee of Ministers of Justice/Attorneys-General also confirmed the findings of the outside consultants. However, the SADC Summit of Heads of State decided to extend the review period, not to reappoint members of the Tribunal whose terms of office were about to expire, and stopped the Tribunal from receiving new cases during the review process. SALC argued that this amounted to a suspension of the Tribunal, which was an illegal action for the SADC Summit to take because it was not allowed according to the SADC Treaty and would deny individuals redress for violations of their rights. The meeting that SALC co-hosted worked to address ways in which regional lawyers, law societies, and civil society organizations could work to ensure that the Tribunal was preserved, and that it emerged from the review process a stronger and more effective mechanism for citizens to secure justice.
SALC has also been assisting in the legal defense of Swaziland Judge Thomas Masuku, a case that it part of a wider rule of law crisis in Swaziland. Swaziland is the last remaining absolute monarchy in Africa, and King Mswati III recently installed a new Chief Justice, who is at the center of the crisis. For example, promptly after being appointed, the Chief Justice issued a judicial edict that said that the King could not be the subject of any legal suit.
The Chief Justice also brought twelve charges of judicial misconduct against Judge Masuku, all of which are unsubstantiated and most of which are not deserving of serious response. For instance, he is accused of destabilizing the court and associating with people who wished to overthrow the regime. He is also accused of referring to the King as “forked tongued” in a judicial decision, a charge that represents a clear misreading of the opinion and a threat to the principle of judicial independence. SALC has been working closely with the advocates representing Judge Masuku in preparation for his hearing before the Judicial Service Commission, a hearing that is presided over by the Chief Justice, the same person who brought the charges. SALC has urged the Swazi authorities to drop the case, which is clearly motivated by fear of independent judges such as Masuku.
However, to be clear, not all of my time this summer has been spent indoors at conference centers and in office parks. I’ve also had the opportunity to explore some of South Africa’s natural beauty, and since pictures are worth a thousand words I’ll end with a picture of myself on the Cape Peninsula.
Friday, August 5, 2011
The Making of a Feminist
I grew more stubborn about my ability to do anything regardless of my gender as I became older, despite gaining a little more realistic caution in the process. I’ve made my more gentlemanly guy friends upset on occasion because I insisted on carrying my bags while they go empty-handed or completing a more physical chore unaided as they stand and watch. Ironically, even with the “I can do it myself” attitude, I am a bit “old-fashioned”/traditional – I still believe it is the guys who should do the asking out for dates and I appreciate men who take the time to hold doors open for women.
I say all this to preface what I am about to say – that I have shied away from the word “feminist.” There are many women rights' leaders who I thank for the privileges that I now enjoy as an American citizen. However, I bought into the most negative connotations of “feminism,” which characterize it as an overbearing and overly aggressive approach to equal rights. This past week has given me a change in perspective though. I have come to realize that much like the words abolitionist, environmentalist, and pacifist, the label “feminist” is a sign of what you are willing to sacrifice for (or have already sacrificed for) and what you believe in. And just like those other words, positive or negative connotations can be given them – by your own actions and/or by others preconceived notions. I’ve come to realize to a much greater extent than before the strength and perseverance that is encompassed in the women’s empowerment movement.
I attended a few all-day meetings last week focused on the women’s political movement in Nigeria. Two of the days were a program run by the International Republican Institute (IRI), a DC based organization “advancing democracy worldwide.” The program was titled “Review of Women’s Political Participation in the 2011 Elections and Strategies Towards 2015.” Women candidates – some elected, some who had lost their bids and others who were contested in their election (meaning their case is currently before the tribunal) – along with some of the women political movement’s leaders, came together with the sole goal of forwarding women’s involvement in the political sphere. Out of all the meetings I have attended here, this one seemed the most useful and most productive. Time was spent discussing what went wrong, what could be changed, what activities needed to start now for 2015 elections.
In those two days, however, I gained a newfound respect for women, all they have done and all they are going to do. Some of these women had been through untold hell just to run for office. Despite maybe not even winning or being substituted by a male party member in the end, they were still at this meeting, determined to discuss election strategies for 2015. And for the most part, these are not the overly optimistic youth you would probably expect. These are women who have raised families and many who have personal stories from elections past. Several of them are likely around or over the retirement age of 60, but you would not guess it from the faces and energy of most of them. They know there is a long road ahead, but they are going to travel it and are working to mentor and encourage other women to join on the path as well.
There is currently a move in Nigeria to implement an affirmative action goal of 35% women in political offices. President Goodluck Jonathan has taken this mandate and appointed 13 female ministers to his cabinet, out of the 43 spots available (slightly short of 35% for those of you calculating, but efforts are being made at least). Most states however, have not domesticated this goal and therefore, it does not have the legal backing, nor the support of all local governments – the 2011 elections actually saw a drop in the number of women elected compared to 2007.
Much like the United States, people have differing views on affirmative action and even some active political women are not supportive of it as a way to increase their numbers in offices. I would guess the reluctance to support such action is partially due to affirmative action sometimes being portrayed as a handout. At the meetings I attended, however, it was reiterated several times that affirmative action was suppose to be a temporary tool to help women empowerment. They were not asking for electorate seats on a golden platter, rather they were asking for fair consideration as qualified candidates. It was even stated that if a woman was just in it for the money, she should step aside and let others knew how to do the job take her spot. These women are asking to be heard, to have the chance to democratically represent a population that is 49% female.
The women are well aware that they will be watched and most critically judged. Some of the comments emphasized this – that the lives they lead must be worth of imitation. They know what it takes to win – they are aware of the need to invest in your constituents, be involved with your community, and engage the support of your party members. However, they were aware of something men do not have to consider as much – they have to prove themselves to give validity to women candidates and that proving of self has to start before they even step into office. Since men have throughout history been considered the natural leaders for such jobs, they are not questioned nor scrutinized as women are. A woman is quizzed on her clothes and hairstyles and questions are raised about whether she is neglecting her duties as a mother and/or wife, whether it would not be better if she stayed at home.
I will not deny men receive their fair share of criticism and face challenges of their own. But they are much more likely to be judged on their actual merit and individual performance in office than a woman. After a scandal, no one says, “Well, that is it, men can’t do the job;” whereas the question of if a woman can do the job is raised before she even announces her bid for office. Women will do the job correctly and they may even do it better than their male counterparts – not necessarily because they are superior to males, but because they must do the job better to claim their place in society; and not just themselves, but for their sisters as well.
I’ve stopped laughing at the “because she’s a woman” jokes that I heard growing up. When you realize what women have fought through just to be accepted as women, such jokes are no longer funny. They just imply that in order to be accepted in the male dominated world, you must become like a man – but even if you do that, you may be called a overly aggressive. I believe in women. I believe that their voices need to be heard alongside the men. I believe they have an unmatched strength and fortitude and can succeed at their chosen courses. I believe that when a job is open, a candidate should be considered on his or her respective qualifications. I believe the genders should not be disregarded – there is great beauty and strength in each – but I believe that for an equal society to exist, both genders must be represented.
If all this makes me a feminist (which, at least by my own definition, it does), then I will proudly claim the label. Here in Nigeria, these women have decided to take a stand. Party lines were put aside and networking was strongly encouraged. Women need to support each other because it is easy to fall into the mentality that you must go it on your own and prove yourself in the boy’s world. But with a population of almost 50/50, it is just as much a women’s world. And there is great value in both sets of voices being heard.
I have desperately tried to prove myself all my life, but it occurs to me now that I have been trying to prove myself in the world of men, rather than prove myself as the woman I am. Come to think of it, in my fight for equal consideration as my brothers, I’ve been a feminist in some ways since a young age. However, I’m learning to give up my bags and step aside when there is a guy around to change the flat tire – not because I couldn’t do the job, but because I am learning to let men be men through their protective strength, while I discover my own strengths as a woman.
Tuesday, August 2, 2011
“There are those that look at things the way they are, and ask why? I dream of things that never were, and ask why not?”
- Robert F. Kennedy
Through my internship at the Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, my vision of what is possible began to change and I started to see the practical applications of this approach. A government does not have to accept the HRBA wholesale for it to provide a helpful, and often well received, critique of its programs and policies. And the HRBA is not limited to government actors, as is clearly evinced by the RFK Center, whose model fully embraces it.